<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<schedule>
 <conference>
  <title>0sec 2009</title>
  <subtitle>a private security event for friends</subtitle>
  <venue>Berne</venue>
  <city>Berne</city>
  <start>2009-10-16</start>
  <end>2009-10-18</end>
  <days>3</days>
  <release>1.0</release>
  <day_change>11:00</day_change>
  <timeslot_duration>00:30</timeslot_duration>
 </conference>
 <day index="1" date="2009-10-16">
  <room name="Talk">
   <event id="30">
    <start>20:00</start>
    <duration>01:00</duration>
    <room>Talk</room>
    <tag>biointro</tag>
    <title>Are you sure you are who you say you are, and how do you know?</title>
    <subtitle>Introduction to biometric recognition</subtitle>
    <track>Talks</track>
    <type>Lecture</type>
    <language>English</language>
    <abstract>Biometric devices and systems have appeared everywhere in various incarnations, 
from fingerprint scanners at the borders to 3D face matchers in private banks. 
Despite the diversity, the core scientific principles stay the same. This talk gives
a firm foundation for understanding a number of biometric recognition techniques,
by insisting on the scientific and engineering background they share in signal processing
and pattern recognition.

We will cover the principles of signal acquisition, feature extraction, modelling
and recognition, evaluation, and datasets for popular modalities such as face,
fingerprints, speech, signature, and others. The math will be kept to the legal minimum.</abstract>
    <description></description>
    <persons>
     <person id="25">Jonas Richiardi</person>
    </persons>
    <links>
    </links>
   </event>
   <event id="37">
    <start>21:30</start>
    <duration>01:00</duration>
    <room>Talk</room>
    <tag>avsignatures</tag>
    <title>Forget AV Signatures, they haven&#8217;t been crucial for years</title>
    <subtitle></subtitle>
    <track>Talks</track>
    <type>Lecture</type>
    <language>English</language>
    <abstract>Most people still think that modern Anti Virus rely mainly on
signatures, which is wrong. Others think signatures are long dead, which
is wrong as well ;-) The fact is, AV signatures are still used in some
cases, but there are more crucial parts that do the main work Today.
Learn strength and weaknesses of newer methods like behavior based
detection, reputation based white listing (don&#8217;t care about clouds) or
application policy based protection. And clear up some myth from the AV</abstract>
    <description></description>
    <persons>
     <person id="26">Candid W&#252;est</person>
    </persons>
    <links>
    </links>
   </event>
   <event id="42">
    <start>23:00</start>
    <duration>00:30</duration>
    <room>Talk</room>
    <tag>flashrom</tag>
    <title>Flashrom and BIOS rootkits</title>
    <subtitle></subtitle>
    <track>Talks</track>
    <type>Lecture</type>
    <language>English</language>
    <abstract>BIOS rootkits have been a major topic in the last few months and various
people have claimed that such rootkits are impossible to detect, while
others claim that detection is possible with the help of some side
effects of the rootkits.
This talk focuses on the history of BIOS rootkits, the current situation
on the market, and on detecting rootkits and other undesirable
modifications of the firmware in your computer, and finally on the
ability (or lack thereof) to clean up any existing infection. The tools
for such analysis and recovery are explained and there will be a small
demo of the usage.</abstract>
    <description></description>
    <persons>
     <person id="22">Carl-Daniel Hailfinger</person>
    </persons>
    <links>
    </links>
   </event>
   <event id="43">
    <start>23:30</start>
    <duration>00:30</duration>
    <room>Talk</room>
    <tag>coreboot</tag>
    <title>Coreboot Research Update</title>
    <subtitle></subtitle>
    <track>Talks</track>
    <type>Lecture</type>
    <language>English</language>
    <abstract>Last year's talk about coreboot focused on basics and security
properties of coreboot. In the meantime, a lot of interesting
developments have happened. People have proposed to use the embedded
controllers in laptops for trojan horses, and locking down machines
against casual attackers has become easier, while sophisticated attacks
have become harder to detect. Embedded controller vendors have opened up
somewhat and major chipset vendors have opened their docs and even
contributed code. At the same time, some companies try to introduce even
more secrecy and undocumented blobs into the BIOS/EFI world.
This talk focuses on the challenges in today's firmware world, how they
relate to security, and what to expect next. A technical explanation of
the constraints of firmware programming and associated security
mechanisms will be given. If desired, generic coreboot questions about
mainboard/chipset/processor support will be answered as well.</abstract>
    <description></description>
    <persons>
     <person id="22">Carl-Daniel Hailfinger</person>
    </persons>
    <links>
    </links>
   </event>
  </room>
  <room name="Lounge">
   <event id="34">
    <start>17:00</start>
    <duration>01:00</duration>
    <room>Lounge</room>
    <tag>dooropenfriday</tag>
    <title>doors opening</title>
    <subtitle></subtitle>
    <track></track>
    <type>Other</type>
    <language>English</language>
    <abstract>Let's start 0sec 2009. We open our doors at 18:00.</abstract>
    <description></description>
    <persons>
     <person id="11">0sec orga team</person>
    </persons>
    <links>
    </links>
   </event>
   <event id="35">
    <start>18:00</start>
    <duration>01:00</duration>
    <room>Lounge</room>
    <tag>welcomeapero</tag>
    <title>welcome ap&#233;ritif</title>
    <subtitle></subtitle>
    <track></track>
    <type>Other</type>
    <language>English</language>
    <abstract></abstract>
    <description></description>
    <persons>
     <person id="11">0sec orga team</person>
    </persons>
    <links>
    </links>
   </event>
  </room>
 </day>
 <day index="2" date="2009-10-17">
  <room name="Talk">
   <event id="36">
    <start>13:00</start>
    <duration>01:00</duration>
    <room>Talk</room>
    <tag>linklawhacking</tag>
    <title>Making a link between law and hacking</title>
    <subtitle></subtitle>
    <track>Talks</track>
    <type>Lecture</type>
    <language>English</language>
    <abstract>The thrill of fame due to hacking expertise has now evolved into a profit making exercise. This session will take a simple look at how law and business are adapting to this new technological danger. The objective is to highlighting the general trends - good or bad - that present hack attacks are instigating within the world that surrounds us.</abstract>
    <description></description>
    <persons>
     <person id="15">Federico Pagiola</person>
    </persons>
    <links>
    </links>
   </event>
   <event id="39">
    <start>14:00</start>
    <duration>01:00</duration>
    <room>Talk</room>
    <tag>voicesecurity</tag>
    <title>Voice security and privacy</title>
    <subtitle>Confidentiality protection, today solutions and upcoming technologies and standards</subtitle>
    <track>Talks</track>
    <type>Lecture</type>
    <language>English</language>
    <abstract>The changes of telecommunication market, from telco monopolist of the
80's to multiple operators working across different countries, along
with the diffusion of new technologies like VoIP completely changed the
rules and the needs of law enforcement that are required to intercept
communications, and of private citizen that want to protect their
privacy.
An overview analysis of voice protection and voice interception
technologies available now and in the near future, used and usable by
private and by governments will be shown.

Technical, political and jurisdictional issues about interception and
protection systems will be presented.

Zphone, VPN, voice security standards, passive interception
technologies, tactical interception technologies, satellite related
issue, ETSI lawful interception rules, national european and north
american laws, the chinese threat are part of the information that will
be presented.

A new "open standard" secure telephony protocol, based on ZRTP and
developed jointly with Philip Zimmermann, will be introduced and
presented compared to other available technologies.</abstract>
    <description></description>
    <persons>
     <person id="27">Fabio Pietrosanti</person>
    </persons>
    <links>
    </links>
   </event>
   <event id="27">
    <start>15:30</start>
    <duration>01:00</duration>
    <room>Talk</room>
    <tag>lugh</tag>
    <title>Lugh</title>
    <subtitle>The malware data collector</subtitle>
    <track>Talks</track>
    <type>Lecture</type>
    <language>English</language>
    <abstract>Current online malware analysis systems (e.g., Joebox, Anubis, Norman
Sandbox, CW Sandbox, Threat Expert) generate behavior data
characterizing the malware being analyzed. The behavior data typically
consists of calls to the operating system kernel and related
subsystems, and API calls in user space. In some cases this data is
insufficient to understand the workings of a malware sample and
additional data - describing system behavior more deeply - needs to be
available to the malware analyst. Examples of "deep data" are
histories of file modifications, including the actual contents of the
files being modified, histories of full memory traces, etc. Currently,
such information is recovered manually using debuggers and similar
tools.
		
The goal of the Lugh project is to develop a novel deep data capturing
tool that overcomes the limitations of existing tools. Lugh is
currently able to capture complete file modification and memory change
histories, stack back traces, partial instruction traces and
screenshots on Windows operating systems. The memory inspection
features allow to track self-modifying code and eventually to unpack
packed code by using a novel efficient memory analysis algorithm. In
fact, first tests have shown that Lugh is able to unpack the code of
all widely used and publicly available packers.
		
Lugh is implemented as a kernel driver in C++ and uses kernel mode
detour hooking to capture system events. Compared to, e.g., emulator
based analysis systems, it is thus relatively hard to detect and
evade.

In this talk, we are going to give an indepth discussion of the
features and some implementation aspects of Lugh.</abstract>
    <description></description>
    <persons>
     <person id="23">Stefan B&#252;hlmann</person>
    </persons>
    <links>
    </links>
   </event>
   <event id="28">
    <start>16:30</start>
    <duration>01:00</duration>
    <room>Talk</room>
    <tag>exposingcrypto</tag>
    <title>Exposing Crypto Bugs through reverse engineering</title>
    <subtitle></subtitle>
    <track>Talks</track>
    <type>Lecture</type>
    <language>English</language>
    <abstract>Breaking good crypto is hard, but so is programming crypto correctly.
The easiest way to break a system is thus often to reverse engineer the
crypto and to find the bugs. We will demonstrate this with three systems
that were broken in our audits:

- The FIPS 142-3 level 2 certified MXI stealth USB key (before it got
patched)
- A version of the E-capsule private safe from EISST
- Data Beckers now defunct Private Safe software</abstract>
    <description></description>
    <persons>
     <person id="16">Philippe Oechslin</person>
    </persons>
    <links>
    </links>
   </event>
   <event id="40">
    <start>18:00</start>
    <duration>01:00</duration>
    <room>Talk</room>
    <tag>tearingdownfences</tag>
    <title>Tearing down the fences</title>
    <subtitle>Why politics and Free Software belong together</subtitle>
    <track>Talks</track>
    <type>Lecture</type>
    <language>German</language>
    <abstract>What does software have to do with politics? What goals are Free
Software activists trying to reach, and how do we do it? How do we
bring the computer's binary logic together with the messy compromise
of politics?

Free Software was a political project from the start. When we want to
share knowledge, we need to get rid of the technological and legal
fences that are holding us back. But how?

This talk will explain how the Free Software Foundation Europe works
to change the way in which our society manages knowledge. It points
out possibilities to do political work for Free Software while keeping
your sanity.</abstract>
    <description></description>
    <persons>
     <person id="28">Karsten Gerloff</person>
    </persons>
    <links>
    </links>
   </event>
   <event id="31">
    <start>21:30</start>
    <duration>01:00</duration>
    <room>Talk</room>
    <tag>biopass</tag>
    <title>Please have your e-passport and fingertips ready please!</title>
    <subtitle>Techniques, issues and challenges in the global move to biometric passports</subtitle>
    <track>Talks</track>
    <type>Lecture</type>
    <language>English</language>
    <abstract>Biometric passports are increasingly mandatory for citizens in industrialised countries
and others. Where did the trend come from? Beyond the politico-legal aspects, 
deployments of such systems to populations in the millions are bound to come with
very challenging problems. In this talk, we'll review the technical background of 
ICAO e-passports and investigate issues that are likely to appear.

We will cover biometric data quality issues, acquisition ergonomics,
age-related issues, interoperability of biometric data/templates/decision thresholds,
large-scale population effects and the Zoo, the information content of biometrics,
and reversibility and synthetic forgeries. Time permitting we'll also dig into
privacy-preserving biometric templates.

This talk builds on the technical principles explained in my first talk,
"introduction to biometric recognition".</abstract>
    <description></description>
    <persons>
     <person id="25">Jonas Richiardi</person>
    </persons>
    <links>
    </links>
   </event>
   <event id="41">
    <start>23:00</start>
    <duration>01:00</duration>
    <room>Talk</room>
    <tag>gsm</tag>
    <title>GSM protocol fuzzing and other fun things you can do to GSM</title>
    <subtitle></subtitle>
    <track>Talks</track>
    <type>Lecture</type>
    <language>English</language>
    <abstract>With the recent availability of more Free Software for GSM protocols, such as
OpenBSC, GSM protocol hacking is no longer off-limits.  Everyone can play with
the lower levels of GSM communications.

It's time to bring the decades of TCP/IP security research into the GSM world,
sending packets incompatible with the state machine, sending wrong length
fields and actually go all the way to fuzz the various layers of the GSM
protocol stack.</abstract>
    <description></description>
    <persons>
     <person id="29">Harald Welte</person>
    </persons>
    <links>
    </links>
   </event>
  </room>
  <room name="Lounge">
   <event id="32">
    <start>11:00</start>
    <duration>01:00</duration>
    <room>Lounge</room>
    <tag>openingday2</tag>
    <title>doors opening</title>
    <subtitle></subtitle>
    <track>Orga</track>
    <type>Other</type>
    <language></language>
    <abstract></abstract>
    <description></description>
    <persons>
     <person id="11">0sec orga team</person>
    </persons>
    <links>
    </links>
   </event>
   <event id="33">
    <start>19:00</start>
    <duration>02:30</duration>
    <room>Lounge</room>
    <tag>lunchday2</tag>
    <title>Lunch</title>
    <subtitle></subtitle>
    <track>Food</track>
    <type>Other</type>
    <language></language>
    <abstract></abstract>
    <description></description>
    <persons>
     <person id="11">0sec orga team</person>
    </persons>
    <links>
    </links>
   </event>
  </room>
 </day>
 <day index="3" date="2009-10-18">
  <room name="Talk">
   <event id="29">
    <start>13:00</start>
    <duration>01:00</duration>
    <room>Talk</room>
    <tag>scanningtheinternet</tag>
    <title>Scanning teh Internet</title>
    <subtitle>Developing and Using a Distributed Port Scanner for Educational Purposes</subtitle>
    <track>Talks</track>
    <type>Lecture</type>
    <language>English</language>
    <abstract>Ever wondered what you would be able to accomplish if you had a chance to
actually scan every Ip Adress on the Net? - Hold Your breath.

For the last two years NiceNameCrew has been researching a lot of IT
security
Topics and publishing good Tools and Information for
Researchers/Hackers/Admins.
I know we have been quiet for a few months now (after sending our
members as
speakers to a whole lot of it security cons). But beeing quiet doesnt mean
we have something cool in the making. So Here we go!
This is acutally the Corresponding Talk to the release of the newest addion
in our set of publication.

A distributed port scanning 'framework' called snaqx! It is a tool
used to perform grand scale scans on networks aswell as scanning one
specific
network from a whole lot of computers (so the scanning creates less noise on
a possible iDS or iPS).

After having explained what snaqx is, i would like to bring your attention
to what this talk is about. Its about scanning your own or your companys
network to provided better security. Participents will learn how to acutally
scan effectivly, what to look out for and how to handle the results.

We are aware, possibly everyone in the it field knows about port scannin,
however you would be supprised how many individuals never ever performed
a scan or how often you get a answer like: " we have nmap for that" but
when they acutally need to scan something they are totally frustated with
questions like: "what port scanning method to choose". "Wtf is the
difference
between tcp_connect, tcp_syn, xmas scan and so on".

We will of corse not only provide participents with the base knowlege to
get stuff done. We are also going to Publish results of our grand scale
network scans on the "Internet".
Therefore this talk provides a nice bridge between beginners Materials
and Experts knowlege.</abstract>
    <description></description>
    <persons>
     <person id="24">natano</person>
    </persons>
    <links>
    </links>
   </event>
   <event id="38">
    <start>14:30</start>
    <duration>01:00</duration>
    <room>Talk</room>
    <tag>ffextensions</tag>
    <title>Fun with Firefox Extensions</title>
    <subtitle></subtitle>
    <track>Talks</track>
    <type>Lecture</type>
    <language>English</language>
    <abstract>Firefox is a very popular browser. Its open designed framework makes it
easy to extend the functionality either by changing the core code
directly or by creating extension plug-ins that work on multiple OSs.
Any installed extension has the same full rights as the browser itself
and can do quite some mischief, similar to BHOs in IE. This includes
file I/O, network sockets, registry etc. and all that cross platform. An
ideal starting point for an attacker, don't you think.
Learn what current malware does with FF extensions, how they hide. See
how easy it is to create a bot or Trojan as FF extension, making it run
inside the browser, cross platform, stealing data etc.</abstract>
    <description></description>
    <persons>
     <person id="26">Candid W&#252;est</person>
    </persons>
    <links>
    </links>
   </event>
  </room>
  <room name="Lounge">
  </room>
 </day>
</schedule>
